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JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATION-ITS POTENTIAL
ToM C. CLARK*
Faith in the Establishment and the personalities that people it has been in-
creasingly on our minds in the last half decade of the sixties. Indeed our young
people have hammered home the idea that all is not well with either the Establish-
ment or those who operate it. The focus has also zeroed in on the courts with their
backlogs, their scandals, and their never ending process. The need for higher stan-
dards of judicial ethics, more effective procedures and techniques of administration,
and an improvement in the appearance of justice itself is heard on all sides. Some
say that the old Halean doctrine should be followed by the judges, namely, that
they be wholly intent upon the business of the courts, "remitting all other cares
and thoughts as unseasonable and interruptions." However, the judges do not
renounce their citizenship and its responsibilities when they take on the robes, and
I submit that they should continue to take an active part in public affairs. This is
not to say that they should engage in partisan politics but merely that they should
not become monastic. Judges are leaders whether they choose to be or not. This
is because the public expects more from them. Judicial conduct-both private and
public-speaks louder than words. Whether good or bad it has a direct public impact.
To many minds the judge is the law. To bend the judge to anyone's will, therefore,
raises grave questions. This makes it the more necessary to give pause to any tempo-
rary popular demand to straitjacket the judges.
There are demands on all sides to reform both the courts and the judges.
Legislatures-federal and state-are on the move with a host of legislative bills.
United States Senator Robert P. Griffin has expressed the view that Congress should
adopt meaningful guidelines on the permissible nonjudicial conduct of federal
judges.' And Senator Joseph Tydings has pending his Judicial Reform Act which
provides, in effect, for a continuing Congressional surveillance of federal judges
through a reporting system.2 A national commission with power to reprimand or
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remove federal judges on grounds of lack of "good behavior" is called for in the
bill.3 Both senators are convinced that their measure would enhance rather than
diminish the independence of the judiciary.
In the state system an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted discipline
and removal commissions, some by legislative act and others by constitutional amend-
ment. Indeed Senator Tydings' proposal is taken from the California experience on
the subject.4 Illinois has adopted the most stringent set of canons and rules of any
of the states. Its Supreme Court has prohibited judges from (i) engaging in the
active management of any business or serving as a director or officer of a for-profit
corporation;5 (2) accepting any duties or obligations that would interfere with the
performance of their judicial duties;6 (3) allowing the use of their names or the
prestige of their office to contribute to the success of any business or charitable
cause; 7 and (4) accepting compensation for any services other than for their judicial
duties.8
A grave question arises under the doctrine of separation of powers when legis-
lative action is taken. As Mr. Justice Sutherland put it, "[t]he sound application of
a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing
his control in the house of another who is master there."' It has the weight of age,
having been declared by Mr. Justice Story in 1826 to be an "enduring monument
of political wisdom. 1 ° A half century later Chief Justice Waite, in commenting
on the doctrine, added that "[t]he safety of our institutions depends in no small
degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule."'1 The judiciary is already
hemmed in by executive and legislative discretion since its very sustenance is
dependent upon the flow of funds from the legislatures, and the enforcement of its
decrees is left entirely to the executive department. In addition, the Executive
appoints the judges in the federal system and in some state systems. It cannot be
gainsaid that the founders intended for each branch of the federal government to be
master of its own house. This is especially true in the judiciary where history
teaches that the bulwark of a free society is its courts.
Judicial independence, of course, has its corollary of judicial responsibility. The
judges must be of the stuff that goes to make a good judiciary. What is this stuff
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of which I speak? Legal knowledge? Yes, and of sufficient quality to be able to
determine the applicable rule of law in a given case together with the wisdom to
apply it with clarity and dispatch. Ability to discover the facts? Yes, and an open
mind to recognize the truth and separate it from the chaff. A firm but understanding
heart? Yes, and the courage to declare a just decision and enforce it. Integrity?
Yes, above all other attributes; and a public and private deportment that is above
reproach. A conscience? Yes, but rather than being one that breeds fear and
negative action it must be a conscience which at the close of each day's work may
whisper softly: "Today you were truly worthy to wear the robe and enjoy the
appellation of judge." To maintain such a status in the public mind judges, like
Caesar's wife, must live above suspicion. They must welcome constructive criticism
of their every act. To do the contrary is to run counter to the nature of every
American to know the facts of life and to speak freely about them.
The Third Branch like Robinson Crusoe is awakening from its lethargy. It took
scandal after scandal to bring the situation into focus: Manton, Davis, Johnson, three
members of Oklahoma's highest court, two from Illinois, a Supreme Court Justice,
and several lesser lights. As each of these unfortunate episodes broke into the
spotlight of publicity a rash of measures were introduced in the legislatures, both
state and federal, but they died on the vine. Nor did the judiciary itself do anything
about these self-inflicted wounds. A typical example was Senate Bil 1613 which was
introduced in the Eighty-eighth Congress.1" It sought to establish an Office of Reports
in each federal circuit to which the judges of the respective circuits would report
annually their extra-judicial activity and income. The Judical Conference dis-
approved the adoption of the bill on the ground that "it was an effort to single
out judges from other officials of the federal establishment."' 3 And so having chided
the Congress, the Conference went on its way without giving any consideration to
the problem. In short it put on blinders and took no action in cleaning up the
judicial house. Perhaps that is why we suffer ignominy today. In short, we in the
federal judiciary must confess that we are dead set in our ways. We have never
learned the lesson taught by Mr. Justice Cardozo that "new times and new manners
may call for new standards and new rules."'4
Of course, the rules of judicial conduct have not only been few but mostly
ambiguous and unenforceable. The American Bar Association did promulgate in
1925 some "guides" and "reminders" sometimes known as Canons. However, they
were adopted by only twelve states which included a total of thirty-three jurisdictions.
In seven states neither a court nor the legislature has promulgated any rules pertaining
to judicial responsibility. Indeed the situation was such that Chief Justice Hughes
once explained that "[w]hat is generally called the 'ethics' of the profession is
1 1613, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).
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but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards."'" But
standards themselves are external and do not deal with personal equations. The
public expects and is entitled to more than ordinary conduct on the part of a judge.
And, I believe, judges are anxious to maintain a high degree of personal conduct.
I submit that most judges are exemplary in their behavioral habits and reflect a
good example.
The action of the Judicial Conference of the United States on June io, 1969, is
conclusive evidence of this. It adopted a realistic resolution banning the receipt of
income from nonjudicial sources, unless the judge had prior approval from his
circuit council. It also imposed public disclosure procedures covering income received
from nonjudicial services together with a balance sheet on assets and liabilities.
It is true that the Conference later suspended the ban on extra-judicial income in
order to afford the American Bar Association Special Committee on Standards of
Judicial Conduct sufficient time to re-evaluate the present canons and come up with
suggested new ones. However, in the interim Chief Justice Burger has created a
review committee of three members to examine the returns of the judges and
make report, where indicated, to the Judicial Conference. In addition he appointed
a seven-man Committee on Judicial Activities to advise the judicial councils of the
circuits as well as individual judges with regard to their off-bench activities, both
compensated and noncompensated. In addition the judges have now filed reports
with the clerk of the court where they sit listing their outside income for the first
six months of i97o. These reports are open to public inspection. Finally, the ABA
Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct has been busy under the chair-
manship of the distinguished Roger J. Traynor, retired Chief Justice of California.
It held open meetings in St. Louis in August and is now polishing up a final draft
which should be ready for the House of Delegates in 1971. At the same time the
Judicial Conference Committee, headed by Court of Appeals Judge Robert Ains-
worth, is readying its report to the Conference at its fall, i97o, session. Even though
the Conference elected to await the final report of the Traynor Committee, it would
still be entirely possible for the federal system to have definitive standards in 1971.
As I have indicated, Illinois has already adopted very stringent rules and pro-
cedures to handle the problem. Some ten states have either a court of the judiciary
or a commission that handles complaints against judges. Only last fall, under the
auspices of the American Judicature Society, a National Conference of Judicial
Retirement and Disability Commissions was organized. It will have its second
conference seminar in Denver during December. At these conferences, programs
are developed covering the outside interests of judges, the handling of complaints,
and the general scope of disciplinary action as well as disability removal. The
Commissions act somewhat like an ombudsman and have been proven very effective.
These experiences though not extensive, save in states like California, indicate
" Semler v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 6o8, 612 (935)..
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that the courts can and will adopt effective procedures for self-regulation. It can
hardly be denied that judges are better qualified to recognize the personal equations
involved in the adoption of standards of judical conduct. After all, they are balancing
and adjusting controversies every day without the interference of political pressures
and campaign exigencies. These are delicate matters that judges can adjust much
more easily and without the compulsion of a legislative enactment. Furthermore, legis-
lators are political animals who react within the framework of their constituencies
which might inject political considerations into final determinations. Finally, a
statute freezes the rule into a straitjacket that can only be relaxed by the action of
both houses of the legislature. This often makes a political football of the rules
and requires cumbersome, delaying, and expensive procedure. On the other hand a
court can change its rule in camera and with greater clarity and dispatch.
Another consideration, often overlooked, is that faithless lawyers are always in-
volved in judicial corruption. I can remember well that a Wall Street lawyer of
high rank in the bar was a co-defendant in Judge Johnson's case in Pennsylvania.1 6
And it was through the use of lawyers that Judge Manton carried on his nefarious
practices.17 Moreover, in states requiring judges to stand for election by the
people some lawyers get the judge so involved in politics that his official posi-
tion is compromised. Sometimes we hear of two types of lawyers: the first knows
the law and the other knows the judge. This creates an unfortunate public image
for the courts as well as the administration of justice. Being officers of the court,
lawyers owe a high sense of duty to the judge. The idea that a lawyer's first
loyalty is to his client-right or wrong-is itself wrong. His first duty is to the ad-
ministration of justice and the courts. In view of these considerations, it is important
and beneficial to enlist the active participation of the bar in the formulation of the
standards. The Traynor Committee has done this through the session in St. Louis
and is continuing to do so through circulations and joint meetings. It is to such
collaboration as this that legislative procedures do not lend themselves effectively. On
the other hand, joint meetings of the judiciary and the bar make it possible to discuss
such niceties as well as to formulate rules that would protect both the judiciary
and the bar from such practices. Our problem in the past has been to get the bar
and the courts to act. I believe that the time is now ripe for such action.
I, therefore, submit that the potential for self-regulation is presently at its
highest tide. And it is most encouraging that the Congress and state legislatures
have deferred action. The judiciary appreciates this cooperative attitude. It is in
the high tradition of our system of checks and balances. The legislatures should
limit their scrutiny of judicial conduct to the minimum, withholding its hands
unless the judiciary fails to act. In this manner the courts can develop an effective
procedure in a minimum of time since they can quickly amend, supplement, or
"See generally J. BoRxIN, THE CORRPT JUDGE 14x-86 (1962).
7 Id. at 25-93.
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revise controls as experience indicates a need for change. In addition this recogni-
tion by its legislative peers will spur the judges to renewed and continued action to
the end that an effective system is devised. Finally, it will eliminate the friction that
too often develops between the two branches and will insure against retaliatory
action by either. It may well be that the judges may find it necessary to implement
their procedures through legislature action. For example, it may prove necessary to
make violations of the judicial code of conduct a criminal offense with sanctions more
burdensome than the judiciary can devise by unilateral action. Again, perhaps some
judges may refuse to make the required reports, in which instance failure to file
might well be made a criminal offense. In this manner, through joint action, a
model code may be implemented into a more effective one.
The judiciary is often said to be the foundation of our free society. It is to be
hoped that we will declare a moratorium on kicking the judges around. Let us
urge that all good men and women come to the courts' aid in shoring up public
confidence not only in the courts themselves but in the people who operate them.
While I verily believe that one who is elevated to judicial office is usually grounded
in the fundamental precepts of good judicial conduct and needs no reminder of
what is right and what is wrong; nevertheless, I urge the adoption by the courts-
both federal and state--of a clear and concise statement of the permissible bounds
of judicial conduct. The principles embodied in such a code would aid in the
recovery of public respect and confidence in the court that is so necessary in a stable
society. I am hopeful that before too long the ABA will approve and promulgate its
final draft of Standards of Judicial Conduct and the courts-federal and state-
will follow with speed in the adoption of clear and concise canons of judicial deport-
ment based thereon, together with practical and effective procedures for their
enforcement.
